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THE COURT MOVES THE DEAD HAND
THE POWER OF A COURT OF' EQUITY TO ALTER, VARY OR
MODIFY THE EXPRESS TERMS OF A TRUST IN AN EMERGENCY
JOSEPH E. BRUNSWICK*
"The Moving Finger writes; and having writ
Moves on: nor all your Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it."
-Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam, Fitzgerald's translation.
H AD the poet been a chancellor, his verse could well
be considered to be a court's expression, adopted to
describe a general view regarding trusts which are cre-
ated without a reservation of power to alter or change.
But the poet was not a chancellor, and the chancellor,
upon turning to his conscience, does not find himself
bound in the iron-jawed vise of the trust instrument-
he will permit change, and when the tears touch his con-
science his decree will wash out the words which caused
the tears.
The extent of the power of equity to alter or vary the
terms of an express trust, which by its terms is irre-
vocable, and the elements of the situation which will
cause the court to exercise this extraordinary power are
problems of moment in periods of inflation as well as
depression. Many a beneficiary of a rich trust finds his
income seriously curtailed, his principal endangered;
many a trustee is faced with a duty to perform trust
functions without funds for the purpose and is at a loss
as to what course to pursue with regard to his duty as
trustee, not only to benefit the trust but also to avoid
personal liability.
Thus, where, by a deed of trust or by a will, the settlor
has stated in unequivocal terms what disposition is to
be made of property, and in what form of investments
it is to be held, the appearance of an emergency which
*Member of Illinois Bar; alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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will cause the destruction of the trust or render it
inoperative may well tax the conscience of the chancellor
and induce the exercise of the extraordinary powers of
equity to authorize a change in administration.
The exercise of that extraordinary power will be
viewed here through cases in which emergency conditions,
not contemplated nor provided for by the settlor, arose
and impelled the trustee to seek approval for a change or
deviation from the terms of the trust.' Only those cases
of private trusts will be considered, however, which are
entirely valid, enforceable, and in the course of adminis-
tration. Accordingly, no further attention will be paid
to those situations where the court will terminate or
modify the trust either because the purpose has been
achieved, 2 or because of illegality,' or because of im-
possibility of performance,4 or because of fraud 5 or mis-
take ;' nor will consideration be given to the problem of
termination of a trust upon application of the bene-
ficiary.7 Also eliminated is all consideration of the cy-pres
doctrine and its application to charitable trusts, except
as they may be part and parcel of a private trust.'
1 Restatement of the Law of Trusts, sec. 4, reads: "The phrase 'terms of
the trust' means the manifestation of intention of the settlor with respect
to the trust expressed in a manner which admits of its proof in judicial
proceedings."
2 Ringrose v. Gleadall, 17 Cal. App. 664, 121 P. 407 (1911) ; Fox v. Fox,
250 Ill. 384, 95 N. E. 498 (1911); Bowditch v. Andrew, 8 Allen (Mass.)
339 (1864); Simmons v. Northwestern Trust Co., 136 Minn. 357, 162 N. W.
450 (1917).
3 Woolley v. Preston, 82 Ky. 415 (1884); Southard v. Southard, 210
Mass. 347, 96 N. E. 941 (1911).
4 Sturgeon v. Stevens, 186 Pa. St. 350, 40 A. 488 (1898).
5 Kilduffe et ux. v. Maitland, 30 W. N. C. (Pa.) 46 (1892).
6 Kerr v. Couper, 5 Del. Ch. 507 (1883).
7 There are many approaches to this problem and a number of causes for
the application. The courts have not been uniform in their determination of
the question. For a full discussion of the problem see: Austin W. Scott,
"Control of Property by the Dead," 65 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 632 (1917) ; Alvin
E. Evans, "Termination of Trusts," 37 Yale L. J. 1070 (1928); Edward
W. Cleary, "Indistructible Testamentary Trusts," 43 Yale L. J. 393 (1934),
and cases cited therein.
8 Nothing seems clearer in the law of trusts than the power to vary the
terms of charitable trusts upon an application of the doctrine of cy pres.
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The discussion here is confined primarily to testa-
mentary trusts and inter-vivos trusts where the settlor
is deceased, for the problem under consideration obvi-
ously does not arise where the settlor has retained a
power of revocation ° or modification. When the settlor
has created an irrevocable trust the same principles
apply as in testamentary trusts," except that proof of
the fact that the settlor would have provided for the
alteration suggested had he foreseen the circumstances
is simpler by reason of the testimony of the settlor.
The first general principle is that a trustee has those
powers given to him by the trust deed or by the will and
no others ;1 he must comply strictly with the terms and
may not deviate from them'" without incurring personal
liability for breach of trust. Of course, if the powers are
general the trustee has greater latitude in the exercise
of them, but the instrument will set the limits whether
broad or narrow. 14 In certain cases where the trustee is
uncertain as to the extent of his authority, he may apply
to the court for interpretation,5 but the court may, and
See Scott, Cases on Trusts (2d ed.), pp. 318-3M6. Restaieizt cf tie Law
of Trusts, secs. 395-401.
By reason of statute 43 Elizabeth, c. 4 (1601), known as the Statute
of Charitable Uses, many of the restrictions and technicalities necessary in
private trusts are eliminated. See Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How.
(43 U. S.) 127, 11 L. Ed. 205 (1844).
10 For right to include power of revocation, see Bear v. Millikin Trust
Co., 336 Ill. 366, 168 N. E. 349, 73 A. L. R. 173 (1929).
11 There seems to be no distinction made by the courts as to whether or
not the settlor is alive if he has no power to change the trust and if he
has not reserved the right he may not modify or alter it. Gulick v. Gulick,
39 N. J. Eq. 401 (1885); Dickerson's Appeal, 115 Pa. St. 198, 8 A. 64
(1887) ; Lawrence v. Lawrence, 181 Ill. 248, 54 N. E. 918 (1899).
12 See 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees (1935) 1733-56, secs. 551-553, and
collection of cases there cited.
13 John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence (1918),
III, 2426, sec. 1062; In re Cole's Estate (Mulberger v. Beurhaus), 102 Wis.
1, 78 N. W. 402 (1899).
14 See footnote 12.
15 "Equity has jurisdiction over all matters relating to trust property,
and in the execution and administration of the trust, in all cases of doubt as
to their rights and liabilities and what their conduct should be, trustees are
entitled to and should seek instruction and direction from the court,"
Laughlin v. Griswold, 169 Wis. 59, (Laughlin v. Wells Bldg. Co.) 171 N. W.
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will, in its discretion, refuse to hear him when it appears
that interpretation is unnecessary,16 and it will not exer-
cise the trustee's discretion for him.' 7 This matter of judi-
cial interpretation is, however, no exception to the prin-
ciple that the instrument determines the powers and
duties, but is rather an extension of it.
Out of this broad general principle of the trustee's
powers is carved a general exception that in a proper
case the court of equity will authorize a trustee to vary or
deviate from the terms of an express trust when an emer-
gency arises.' 8 The Supreme Court of Illinois, in the
early case of Curtiss v. Brown, 9 gave a full, compre-
hensive, and understanding statement of the power and
the reasons for it when it said:
Can it be said that the beneficiary of an estate which would bring
in the market one hundred thousand dollars, should perish in
the street from want or be sent to the poor-house for support,
or that the estate should be totally lost, because there is no
power in the courts to relieve against the provisions of the
instrument creating this trust? Exigencies often arise not
contemplated by the party creating the trust, and which, had
they been anticipated, would undoubtedly have been provided
for, where the aid of a court of chancery must be invoked to
grant relief imperatively required; and in such cases the court
must, as far as may be, occupy the place of the party creating
the trust, and do with the fund what he would have dictated
had he anticipated the emergency. . . . From very necessity a
power must exist somewhere in the community to grant relief
in such cases of absolute necessity, and ... that power is vested
in the court of chancery.
From these words of the court one might conclude at
first blush that the problem is answered-the court of
755 (1919). See also Denegre v. Walker, 214 Ill. 113, 73 N. E. 409, 105
Am. St. Rep. 98 (1905).
16 Shurtleff v. Schoenleber, 106 Neb. 870, 184 N. W. 814 (1921).
17 McCarthy v. Tierney, 116 Conn. 588, 165 A. 807 (1933); In re
Wander's Will, 252 N. Y. S. 813 (1931).
18 Restatement of the Law of Trusts, par. 167, and the cases cited through-
out the following subject matter.
19 29 Ill. 201 (1862). See also Pennington v. Metropolitan Museum of
Art, 65 N. J. Eq. 11, 55 A. 468 (1903).
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equity will authorize the trustee to vary the terms of an
express trust in an emergency. This is true, but these
questions then present themselves: Whence comes the
power of the court? When does such an emergency situ-
ation exist? To what degree will the court authorize the
trustee to deviate?
As to the power of the court to hear and determine
applications from the trustee for leave to deviate from
the express terms of the trust, or from the beneficiaries
to compel the deviation, we find the statement: "The
court's power to alter administrative terms of the trust
and thus change the power of the trustee is doubtless an
inherent power. "20 In the reported cases and text mate-
rial on this power there seems to be no distinct historical
background or growth. It appears to be a doctrine which
sprang up under equitable principles, 21 and, once having
come into being, it appears to have gone through little or
no development, but to exist as it appears in the earliest
cases where found. Some development may be seen in
application of the doctrine to particular sets of facts, but
the principle seems to have been constant. The exercise
of the power by the court in authorizing such deviations
is perhaps best explained by the statement:
The jurisdiction of a court of equity does not depend upon the
mere accident whether the court has, in some previous case or
at some distant period of time, granted relief under similar
circumstances, but rather upon the necessities of mankind and
the great principles of natural justice, which are recognized by
the courts as a part of the law of the land, and which are applic-
able alike to all conditions of society, all ages and all people....
Where it is clear [that] the circumstances of the case in hand
require an application of those principles, the fact that no pre-
cedent can be found in which relief has been granted under a
similar state of facts is no reason for refusing it.22
In three classes of cases courts of equity have consid-
20 New Jersey National Bank and Trust Co. v. Lincoln Mortgage and
Title Guaranty Co., 105 N. J. Eq. 557, 148 A. 713 (1930).
21 Longwith v. Riggs, 123 Ill. 258, 14 N. E. 840 (1887).
22 Dodge v. Cole, 97 Ill. 338 (1881).
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ered that the facts show the type of emergency in which
its power will be exercised: (1) where, by a construction
of the instrument, it is found that the testator or settlor
contemplated that the acts for which the trustee seeks
authority were the real intent and were actually directed
by the language used ;23 (2) where a change from the
express terms is necessary to carry out the intent of the
testator or settlor ;24 (3) where a deviation from the
express terms of the trust becomes necessary to preserve
the trust property and in addition to make possible the
continued existence of the trust so that its purpose may
be consummated. 5
The first two classes may appear to be so similar as to
be identical but an analysis will show a striking differ-
ence. Strictly, the first class is not a deviation but an
interpretation, the court finding that the apparent devia-
tion decreed was exactly what the testator intended by
the words he used.26 The second class is composed of
those cases where the court finds the general intent, but
also finds that the express terms prohibit its consumia-
tion by reason of some change in circumstance, and
accordingly decrees authority to the trustee to deviate
from those terms." From this comparison the difference
is seen; the first class is not truly a deviation, but merely
an apparent one.
The first class of cases is composed principally of those
cases where a testator devises or bequeaths property in
trust with the direction that the income be applied to the
23 This situation usually arises in will cases or in cases for the construc-
tion of a trust, and, as is explained in the following discussion and cases
cited is not actually a deviation.
24 See cases cited following and Restatement of the Law of Trusts, sec.
167, and illustrations 6, 7, 8 and 9 there stated.
25 See cases cited following, and Restatement of the Law of Trusts, sec.
167, and illustrations 6, 7, 8 and 9 there stated.
26 The cases on this point are legion. For a collection from all jurisdic-
tions see all the Decennial Digests of American Digest: Wills, key numbers
439 and 684 (6).
27 Restatement of the Law of Trusts, sec. 167.
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support of one or more beneficiaries with a remainder
over to others, or to the same beneficiaries after a period
of years. Under these circumstances the court will gen-
erally find by reason of the words used, when the doctrine
is applied, that the intent of the testator or settlor was to
provide support to the named beneficiaries without re-
gard to the remainder, and in the event the income is
inadequate to provide suitable support or a minimum
sum named, will make the payments a charge upon the
principal fund.28
In the case of Gluckman v. Roberson,29 the New Jersey
court was asked to pass upon a will which devised prop-
erty to trustees and provided a minimum payment of $40
a week out of income to the widow with a remainder to
charity. In this typical case the court found that the
primary intent of the testator was to support the widow
and decreed that the payments should be a charge upon
the principal, saying, "I construe the second paragraph
to provide that the executors and trustees are authorized
to pay the widow out of the corpus such sums as may be
necessary.
In Wilce v. Van Anden,3 0 the court found that a will
devising property to a trustee which was to be disposed
of and used in raising a set fund "from which, together
with the income thereof, they shall pay annuities" to cer-
tain beneficiaries, with a remainder to charity, was suffi-
cient to charge the corpus with the annuity payments.8 1
However, the court will often refuse to charge the
principal with payments when it does not affirmatively
appear from the instrument that the payments were the
28 Hedges v. Hopper, 118 N. J. Eq. 359, 179 A. 261 (1935); Rezzemini
v. Brooks, 236 N. Y. 184, 140 N. E. 237 (1923).
29 115 N. J. Eq. 522, 171 A. 674 (1934).
30 248 I1. 358, 94 N. E. 42 (1911).
31 It is interesting to note that in this case the gift over to charity was
held void because of the uncertainty of the trust res on the reasoning that
since the aniuities were charges upon the corpus of the estate there could
be no certainty as to the amount which could be left.
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primary intent and when it appears that one other than
the recipient of the support is entitled to the residue 2 or
where the one entitled to support will take the residue
contingent upon certain events.8 3 The court will not de-
termine which party the testator intended to favor.3 4
Thus, this first class of cases is not truly the granting
of an authorization to deviate from the terms of a trust
but amounts to a finding by the court that the testator
intended to do what is ordered done. Nevertheless, these
decisions give rise to the thought that the court may, in
certain cases, in fact be varying the terms of the trust
and be furnishing its own ideas of what the testator
ought to have intended. 5
In the second class of cases, those in which a change
from the express terms is necessary to carry out the
intent of the testator or settlor, are found the cases in
which the court unhesitatingly states that by virtue of
its equity powers it is deviating from the trust. 6 In both
this class and the third class we find the courts saying
that an emergency has arisen and it is the duty of the
court to place itself in the position of the settlor and do
what he would have done to carry out his primary intent37
in view of the unexpected circumstances.
32 Stephens v. Collison, 274 Ill. 389, 113 N. E. 691 (1916) ; Shaller v.
Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 319 Mo. 128, 3 S. W. (2d) 726 (1928).
33 Olsen v. Youngerman, 136 Iowa 404, 113 N. W. 938 (1907).
34 This raises a very questionable argument in the mind of the court and
it is usually unwilling to make this decision; 'see Stewart v. Hamilton, 151
Tenn. 396, 270 S. W. 79 (1925).
35 There is no more firmly established doctrine than that the court will
not make a new will for the testator, but the suggestion is often raised that
the courts do it in fact under the guise of interpretation. Willis v. Watson,
4 Scam. (5 Ill.) 64 (1842).
36 Marsh v. Reed, 184 Ill. 263, 56 N. E. 306 (1900); Weakley v. Barrow,
137 Tenn. 224, 192 S. W. 927 (1917), where the court said, "Courts of
chancery under their inherent jurisdiction to administer and protect trust
estates, and to direct the conversion of realty into personalty, and vice versa,
have the power to modify the terms as to management of a trust imposed
by the settlor, under this doctrine; that is, when, by reason of some exigency
arising from unforeseen and unanticipated circumstances, the property held
in trust will fail to answer the primary purposes of the trust, if the court's
power is not brought into exercise."
37 Curtiss v. Brown, 29 Ill. 201 (1862).
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The typical pattern in a case of the second class is
where S devises property to T upon trust with the ex-
press direction that the income therefrom be devoted to
the care and support of B, and in equally express terms
directs that T invest the funds in bonds X and no others.
In the course of years, bonds X become a precarious
investment, and default in payment of interest. B, the
chief object of the settlor's bounty, becomes destitute,
although the principal fund continues to exist in a some-
what diminished but adequate amount, which could pro-
duce income if invested in some other property. When
this condition exists, the court will authorize the trustee
to sell securities X and reinvest in income-producing
securities despite the clear mandate of the trust terms to
hold securities X on the theory that had the settlor been
present to direct the investments he would have done
so to continue to provide support for B. 8 It must be
noted that this power is one which the court will exercise
only with the greatest caution,8 9 and not at the mere
petition of the beneficiary, ° or when its exercise is
merely advantageous to the beneficiary."
In a well-known Kentucky case, a testator left his busi-
ness in trust with the provision that the income be paid
to certain beneficiaries. Difficulty arose because the
business was that of making whiskey barrels and the
advent of the prohibition era destroyed the market. Un-
der this set of circumstances, the court determined that
the physical property, which was of considerable value,
should be sold and the proceeds invested in income pro-
ducing property in order that the payments for support
might still be continued.42
38 Ibid. Restatement of the Law of Trusts, sec. 167.
39 In re Tollemache, [1903] 1 Ch. 457, 955.
40 In re Lensman's Will, 243 N. Y. S. 126 (1930); Hoffman v. New
England Trust Co., 187 Mass. 205, 72 N. E. 952 (1905).
41 Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 145 A. 648 (1929); Stephens v.
Collison, 274 Ill. 389, 113 N. E. 691 (1916) ; In re Tollemache, [1903] 1 Ch.
457, 955.
42 Stout v. Stout, 192 Ky. 504, 233 S. W. 1057 (1921).
THE COURT MOVES THE DEAD HAND
Another case of the same general type was one decided
by the New Jersey court in which the testator had left
his interest in a jewelry business in trust with direction
that the income be paid to certain named beneficiaries.
Because of changing conditions in the industry it became
apparent that the income would soon become inadequate
for the trust purposes, and the court accordingly author-
ized a sale of the property and a reinvestment in other
securities. 43
However, the Illinois court which had often directed a
change in trust administration 44 when necessary to accom-
plish trust purposes, refused to permit deviation and
sale of the corpus in a case where it appeared that such
change was unecessary for the fulfilment of the trust
purpose, although it would have been profitable for the
beneficiaries. 45
The third class, where a deviation from the express
terms of the trust is necessary for the preservation of the
trust property, is the type of case in which it is simplest
for the court to authorize a deviation. When it is appar-
ent that investments held by the trustee are so precarious
that reinvestment is essential to the continued existence
of the trust, the court will authorize the trustee to sell
and reinvest.
Examples of this situation are seen where farm land
is heavily taxed because of expansion of cities, 46 where
business conveyed in trust becomes unprofitable, 7 and
where securities of one type or another, by reason of the
condition of the business or property securing them,
becomes a hazardous investment. 48
43 Price v. Long, 87 N. J. Eq. 578, 101 A. 195 (1917).
44 Starting with Curtiss v. Brown, 29 Ill. 201 (1862), the Illinois court
has been a leading jurisdiction in permitting deviations from the terms of
an express trust in an emergency and has followed the doctrine in at least
fourteen cases which are cited throughout this discussion. See footnote 72.
45 Johns v. Johns, 172 111. 472, 50 N. E. 337 (1898).
46 Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227, 33 N. E. 858 (1893).
47 Hewitt v. Beattie, 106 Conn. 602, 138 A. 795 (1927).
48 Price v. Long, 87 N. J. Eq. 578, 101 A. 195 (1917).
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This third class is in a sense an extension of the second,
and the two taken together as one give the true example
of the type of case in which the court properly exercises
its extraordinary power of authorizing a trustee to devi-
ate from the express terms of his trust.
An example of this type is seen in an Illinois case
where the testator left his farm in trust with the direc-
tion that the income be paid to certain beneficiaries and
that it be used only as a farm for the period of the trust.
Because of the growth of the nearby city which extended
out to the farm, taxes were increased and special assess-
ments levied so that there was grave danger that the
property would be sold for taxes and the corpus of the
estate thus destroyed. Faced with this situation, the court
authorized a sale of part of the land, which was of great
value, for the purpose of subdividing, in order to raise
funds to save the balance."9
The degree to which the court will authorize deviation,
exclusive of termination or advances, may be summed up
by stating the various alterations or deviations which
have been considered adequate to accomplish the pur-
poses. These are: (1) granting of power to sell,5"
(2) granting a power to lease,51 (3) granting a power to
improve realty,52 (4) granting power to change invest-
49 Johns v. Montgomery, 265 Ill. 21, 106 N. E. 497 (1914).
50 Stout v. Stout, 192 Ky. 504, 233 S. W. 1057 (1921) ; Price v. Long,
87 N. J. Eq. 578, 101 A. 195 (1917) ; Johns v. Montgomery, 265 Ill. 21, 106
N. E. 497 (1914) ; Bibb v. Bibb, 204 Ala. 541, 86 So. 376 (1920), sale of
land; Vickers v. Vickers, 189 Ky. 323, 225 S. W. 44 (1920), sale of land,;
Davis, Petitioner, 14 Allen (Mass.) 24 (1867), sale of residence; Upham v.
Plankinton, 166 Wis. 271, 165 N. W. 18 (1917), sale of residence, now in
business district; In re O'Donnell, 221 N. Y. 197, 116 N. E. 1001 (1917) ;
Graney v. Connolly, 124 Me. 221, 126 A. 878 (1924), sale of unproductive
lands. See also Mann v. Mann, 122 Me. 468, 120 A. 541 (1923).
51 Marsh v. Reed, 184 Ill. 263, 56 N. E. 306 (1900) ; Mayall v. Mayall,
63 Minn. 511, 65 N. W. 942 (1896).
52 In re Newman's Settled Estates, 9 Ch. App. 681 (1874). One of the
most interesting cases on the general subject is Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown,
105 Conn. 261, 135 A. 555 (1926), where the court authorized the improving
of and leasing for a term of years of valuable business property which actions
were expressly prohibited by the will. The court mentions public policy as
part of its reason, but basically the improvement of the trust controlled.
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ments or make unauthorized investments."' These powers
practically run the whole gamut of activities in which a
trustee could be engaged; so it appears that the court has
ample power to protect a trust in any circumstance which
might arise by the use of one or another type of
deviation.
In recent years, since a trust deed in the nature of a
mortgage has been frequently used in place of the com-
mon-law form of mortgage, courts have been presented
with the problem of determining whether their broad
equitable power to vary the terms of a trust may prop-
erly be applied in the foreclosure of a trust deed. It
might be suggested that in case of a frozen real estate
market the court should use its power to effect a liquidat-
ing arrangement for the benefit of the holders of bonds
secured by the trust deed. This phase of the problem was
presented in the case of Chicago Title and Trust Com-
pany v. Robin,54 where the Supreme Court of Illinois
decided that a court of equity could not exercise its
power, even in the face of an emergency, to compel the
trustee to bid for the property at the foreclosure sale for
the benefit of the bondholders. The court here treated the
case as one where the relation between the parties was
one of contract, and, thus, where the court could not make
a new contract for the parties. If the court had regarded
the case as one of ordinary trust, however, it would have
had abundant authority in Illinois to support the view
53 In re London's Estate, 171 N. Y. S. 981 (1918) ; New Jersey National
Bank & Trust Co. v. Lincoln Mortgage and Title Guaranty Co., 105 N. J.
Eq. 557, 148 A. 713 (1930); In re New, [1901] 2 Ch. 534.
54 361 Ill. 261, 198 N. E. 4 (1935). Now stare decisis by reason of
Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Bamberg, 361 I1. 291, 198 N. E. 10 (1935),
which follows the decision on the main case. The case came to the Supreme
Court on certificate of importance from the Appellate Court of the first dis-
trict which had affirmed a decree of the Circuit Court of Cook County,
which directed that the trustee under a trust deed conveying real estate to
secure bonds bid in the property for the benefit of all bondholders in the
event the price bid at the sale was inadequate or below a figure set by the
court, and should hold the property for the benefit of said bondholders. See
13 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 160 and 355.
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that equity could vary the terms of an express trust.55
And it is interesting to note that in other jurisdictions
trust deeds have been treated as coming under the gen-
eral principle of trusts, with the result that the court
of equity will vary the terms of a trust to effect a con-
servation of the property for the beneficiaries."
Although the power of a court of equity to authorize
deviation from the express terms of a trust in a proper
case is well supported and established by sufficient
authorities, three problems arise on which little or no
authority is to be found: First, What is the liability of
the trustee if he deviates from the express terms of a
trust in an emergency without authority of the court?"
Second, What is the trustee's. liability if he complies.
strictly with the trust terms under circumstances which
would properly move a court to authorize deviation and
makes no application for that authorization, 8  Third,
What will the court's response be to requested deviation
when, because of conditions, the purchasing power of the
rust icome is wholly uauequate for t express trus
purposes, but when the property is in no danger of de-
55 Curtiss v. Brown, 29 Ill. 201 (1862) ; Voris v. Sloan, 68 Ill. 588 (1873) ;
Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227, 33 N. E. 858 (1893) ; Longwith v. Riggs, 123 Ill.
258, 14 N. E. 840 (1887); Baldridge v. Coffey, 184 Ill. 73, 56 N. E. 411
(1900) ; Marsh v. Reed, 184 Ill. 263, 56 N. E. 306 (1900) ; Gavin v. Curtin,
171 I1. 640, 49 N. E. 523 (1898) ; Denegre v. Walker, 214 Ill. 113, 73 N. E.
409 (1905) ; Johnson v. Buck, 220 Ill. 226, 77 N. E. 163 (1906) ; Roberts v.
Roberts, 259 Ill. 115, 102 N. E. 239 (1913); Packard v. Illinois Trust and
Savings Bank, 261 Ill. 450, 104 N. E. 275 (1914) ; Johns v. Montgomery, 265
Ill. 21, 106 N. E. 497 (1914) ; Cary v. Cary, 309 Ill. 330, 141 N. E. 156
(1923) ; Suiter v. McWard, 328 Ill. 462, 159 N. E. 799 (1928).
56 Hoffman v. First Bond and Mortgage Co. of Hartford, Inc., 116 Conn.
320, 164 A. 656 (1933) ; First National Bank in Wichita v. Neil, 137 Kan.
436, 20 P. (2d) 528, 88 A. L. R. 1252, and note, 1260 (1933) ; Nay Aug
Lumber Co. v. Scranton Trust Co., 240 Pa. 500, 87 A. 843 (1913) ; Watson
v. Scranton Trust Co., 240 Pa. 507, 87 A. 845 (1913) ; Sturges v. Knapp,
31 Vt. 1 (1858). See also 12 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 1, 131.
57 Restatement of the Law of Trusts, sec. 167, par. (2).
58 See Austin Wakeman Scott, "Deviation from the Terms of a Trust,"
44 Harv. L. Rev. 1025 (1931).
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struction and is actually enhanced in value and* the
income in terms of dollars is unaffected?"
It is clear that a trustee is liable for any loss which
may occur because of his deviation which the court would
not have authorized. 0 As to his liability for a deviation
which the court would have authorized on application
but which has turned out ill, there is conflict of author-
ity.61 Deviations which are profitable and which the
court would have authorized, create no liability and they
will be ratified by the court on application.2
The most serious and doubtful branch of the problem
lies in the situation where an emergency arises under
which the court should properly authorize a deviation,
but, because of the urgent nature of the emergency, the
trustee does not have time to apply to the court for
authority and, hence, in good faith deviates from his
powers with a resulting loss to the estate. In this state
of affairs, the court, acting upon a petition filed after-
ward, may well say that the facts at the time of the devia-
tion were apparently sufficient to have induced it to
exercise its powers, but that, since the deviation resulted
disadvantageously to the trust, the court in its wise dis-
cretion would not, at the time of the filing of the petition,
authorize it to be done nor ratify it after it has been
done. 6 3 On this doubtful point it is suggested that the
better and more reasonable rule should be that if the
deviation is made in good faith, in the face of an emer-
gency, and was of such a nature that the court would
59 The writer has found no cases arising under this state of affairs but
approaches the question with the suggestion that should the courts feel called
upon to enlarge their view of allowing deviation from trusts, they will
undoubtedly be called upon to consider petitions founded upon this type
of emergency.
60 McCrory v. Beeler, 155 Md. 456, 142 A. 587 (1928); Estate of
Sharpe, 2 Phila. 280 (1857).
61 Grennan v. Pierce, 229 Mass. 292, 118 N. E. 301 (1918); Dewey v.
Burke, 246 Mass. 435, 141 N. E. 117 (1923).
62 Brown v. Hazelhurst, 54 Md. 26 (1880) ; Williams v. Smith, 10 R. I.
280 (1872).
63 Shirk v. Soper, 144 Md. 269, 124 A. 911 (1923).
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have authorized it at the time of the deviation no liability
should attach to the acts of the trustee, regardless of the
financial result. 4
No less doubtful is the liability of a trustee for not
seeking to deviate from the trust when it would be
proper. It has been stated that even though a trustee
carries out his duty to the letter in conforming to invest-
ments stipulated in the trust deed, he is, nevertheless,
not relieved of the duty of watching carefully over the
investments.65 In the light of this, may a trustee without
liability sit complacently by and watch the trust corpus
diminish and disappear merely because he is literally
complying with investment restrictions even though a
change in circumstances is destroying the value of the
investments? Or is it his duty to apply to a court of
competent jurisdiction for authority to deviate from the
terms of that trust, to take such steps as are necessary
to preserve the income or corpus?
A search of the authorities fails to reveal a satisfactory
answer.66 The Restatement of the Law of Trusts states
that under circumstances of this nature it is the duty of
the trustee to act within a reasonable time and in a rea-
sonable manner.6 7 In addition, it has been held in a case
brought to enforce liability upon the trustee for loss
occasioned by failure to sell securities in a trust fund
which were an exceedingly precarious investment that a
cause of action had been stated.6" In a recent New York
case involving the fiduciary duties of a guardian the
court stated that the guardian would be liable for im-
proper investments in hazardous securities although that
64 1 Restatement of the Law of Trusts 424, sec. 167, comment on sub-
section (2), e, 5.
65 Jairus Ware Perry, A Treatise on the Law of Trusts and Trustees
(3d ed.), I, 584, sec. 465.
66 Although there is some discussion in the secondary authorities, all of
the writers seem to find only one case squarely in point. See footnote 68.
67 Restatement of the Law of Trusts, sec. 167, par. 3.
68 Johns v. Herbert, 2 App. D. C. 485 (1894).
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class of securities was sanctioned by the statute as being
proper for investment of trust funds.6 9 How far the
courts of various jurisdictions will go in following this
rule, if rule it be, is a matter of speculation, but it seems
that if the courts adopt the Restatement in their opinions
and make it the primary law by their adoption, at least
some courts will adopt this section along with others.
What course the courts will follow in the face of cir-
cumstances which destroy the purchasing power of the
trust income, is a question about which there can be noth-
ing but speculation. Although such a situation may defeat
the intent of the settlor and thus bring the problem within
the second class of cases just discussed in that diminished
purchasing power of income on fixed investments actually
fails to provide adequate support for beneficiaries, it
would seem that the courts will have to reach a stage of
liberality unknown at the present time before they will
decree a change under such circumstances. Statutes 0 and
policy governing trust investments at the present time
should bind the court to refuse relief under such a state
of affairs. The problem is one which may become impor-
tant in the event of currency inflation. It is of particular
interest as a scholastic query, because it might place the
court in a dilemma, for if the case falls within one of the
classes under which the court should grant relief because
of the impairment of the trust purposes, it may at the
same time be of such a nature as to find the courts bound
by policy and statute.
In summation it may be said that "when, through an
overabundance of caution, accompanied by a lack of fore-
sight to provide for contingencies, the testator directs
69 Delafield v. Barret, 270 N. Y. 43, 200 N. E. 67 (1936). As an indica-
tion of what the courts may do in this case, the court by way of dictum,
citing other New York cases, held that mere statutory eligibility did not
excuse loss. Of course, here the guardian had power to invest in any legal
security. The type of case where the question is usually raised is one where
the trustee is expressly directed to hold a certain, definite security.
70 For example, Ill. State Bar. Stats. 1935, Ch. 3, par. 144.
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that his hand, though stilled by death, shall continue to
conduct and control his property ' 71 and when an emer-
gency arises which threatens the trust, the court of
equity, in the exercise of its equitable powers will decide
that "had the donor of the trust foreseen the exigencies
that have arisen since the trust declaration was made, a
due regard for the interest of his beneficiaries would have
compelled him to make a provision. '7 However, on the
three special questions, it can only be said that the
answers remain a matter of doubt and speculation; but
they are problems worthy of considerable thought on the
part of persons who are, or may, find themselves in the
situations suggested and who may be compelled to take
them to reviewing courts as cases of first impression.
71 Young v. Young, 255 Mich. 173, 237 N. W. 535 (1931).
72 Johns v. Montgomery, 265 Ill. 21, 106 N. E. 497 (1914).
